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[L. A. No. 17299. In Bank. Mar. 5, 1942.]
THEODORE WEINER, Appellant v. J. B. ROOF et al., Defendants; CITIZENS NATIONAL TRUST & SAVINGS
BANK (a National Banking .Corporation) , Respondent.
[1] Agency-Relation :Between Agent and Third Person....;.aestitution-Ballk.-A bank which as trustee of a subdivision trust
makes collections from purchasers of lots on behalf of its
principals, whether designated an agent or trustee, is, as to
money paid by . a purchaser who has been induced to sign a
contract through fraud of a vendor, governed by the rule
that one who has paid money through fraud or mistake to
an innocent agent, may' recover the amount .trom the agent
unless the latter has paid it to the prmcipal, spent it on behalf
of the principal, or paid it to a third party on behalf of the
principal.
[2] ld.-Relation Between Agent and Third Person-RestttutionOrediting Principal with Receipts.-An innocent agent who
receives money through fraud is not relieved from his obliga"
tion to make restitution to the person defrauded by reason
of the fact that he credited the principal with the amount received, so long as he continues to hold the money on behalf of
the principal.
[3a, 3b] ld.-Relation Between Agent and Third Person-Restitution-Bank~-Where()a bank as trustee of a subdivision trust
has credited amounts" received from a defrauded purchaser
to an indebtedness owing to it by one of its principals with
his consent, without knowledge at the time of the fraud, and
where it holds the money in its private capacity, it is a bona
fide purchaser for value and is entitled to retain the money.
[4] ld.-Relation Between Agent and Third Person-RestitutionPayment of Debt of Principal, Effect of.-If ali innocent agent
receives money through fraud or mistake and pays it to a
third party on behalf of his principal in payment of a debt
owed the third party by the principal, the agent cannot be
required to make restitution of the money.
'
[6] Money Received-Defenses-Bona Fide Purchase.-If a person receives money from another's agent in payment of a
[1] See 1 Oal•. Jur. 689, 690; 215 Oal~Jur. W~, 122; 2 Am. Jur. 264.
McK. Dig. Refeiences: [i~4,' 6] Agency, '§ 167; [5, 7] Money
Received, § 18.
.
.
.
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debt owed to him by the principal, having no notice that the
original owner of the money who paid it to the agent had a
claim for restitution on the ground' of fraud or mistake, the
receiver is a bona fide purchaser for value, and is entitled to
retain the money as against. such original owner. Extinguishment of the past indebtedness .by the receiver is considered
a change of po.sition sufficient .to preclude a recovery from
him, even though it would be possible for him to give up the
money and retain his original claim against the debtor.
[6J Agency-Relation Between Agent and Third Perso:!1-Restitution"";Agent as Oreditor.-If an innocent agent who receives
money through fraud or mistake is a creditor of 1).is principal,
and,with the latter's consent, applies the money received
toward the payment· of the debt, he is a bona fide purchaser
for vaJue and may retain the money as against the ,original
owner.
[7J Money Received - Defenses-Bona Fide Purchase-Value.Past indebtedness is sufficient value to justify one in retaining
as against the original owner money received from a debtor
who procured it by fraud or mistake, and the one receiving
the money will not be left to his original claim against the
debtor.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County. Thurmond Clarke, Judge. Affirmed.
Action to rescind a contract of purchase, and for return of
purchase money paid. Judgment on a second trial 'in favor of
a trustee bank· defendant affirmed.
I. Gralla and Henry O. Wackerbarth for Appellant.
Chandler & Wright, John F. Gilbert and OliverS. Northcote for Respondent.
TRAYNOR, J.-Joseph P. Connolly owned an 80-acre tract
of unimproved land in Los ,Angeles, which he contracted to
sell in 1927 to J. B. Roof, Incorporated,' for $5,500 an acre
plus" one half the profits to be realized from the subdivision
of the property and sale of the lots. To carry out the sale
Connolly and J. B. Roof, Inc., set up a subdivision trust with
the Farmers-and Merchants National Bank of Los Angeles as
trustee. Under the terms of the trust, J.B. Roof, Il!C., was to
subdivide the traetl construct street improvemonts/at its own
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expense, and sell the lots. The trustee was to execute the contracts of sale, make collectioIliS from the purchasers of the
lots, pay to Connolly from these funds the amount owed him
by J. B. Roof, Inc., for the land, and distribute the remainder
to J. B. Roof,-Inc; In 1929 the Farmers and Merchants National Bank assigned all its rights as trustee under the trust,
including all previous contracts of purchase, to the Citizens
National Trust and Savings Bank, and a new trust agreement was entered into between Connolly, J. B. Roof, Inc., and
the Citizens' Bank; Under the terms of this agreement the
Citizens Bank, as trustee, held legal title to the property and
made' collections from the purchasers of the lots. From funds
thus collected' the. trustee could reimburse itself for advances
to the trust. As the funds were received, a portion was allocated to certain accounts for the payment of trust expenses,
including fees and commissions of the trustee. Another portion was allocated to an accOlUnt for payment of improvements. Connolly then received payment on the amount owed
him by J. B. Roof, Inc., as purchase price of the land, including half the profits, and the remainder was paid to J. B. Roof,
Inc. The trust recited that Connolly was indebted to the Citizens Bank in the sum of $225,000 and authorized the bank to
apply Connolly's share of the collections' as they were received toward payment of this debt. The payments thus received by the bank were treated as payments to Connolly of
.
his share of the proceeds.
In 1927, the plaintiff, Theodore Weiner, was induced by
J. B. Roof, Inc., to contract to 'purchase a lot for $3,500, and
he began making payments to the trustee. Certain representations made by J. B. Roof, Inc., proved false. These representations were not included in the written contract, which
contained a clause limiting the responsibility of the seller to
representations therein set forth. In 1932 plaintiff gave notice
of rescission and brought suit against J. B. Roof, J. B. Roof,
Inc., and the Citizens Bank to rescind the contract of purchase because of fraud and to recover the money he had paid
on the purchase price of the lot. He recovered a judgment
against J. B. Roof and J. B. Roof, Inc., for $3,807.0l and
against the bank for $1,890,
latter amount representing
payments. plaintiff made to the bank after it became trustee.
'rhe bank alone appealed from the judgment. On that appeal
this court held that under the principle of Speck v. Wylie, 1

the
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Cal. (2d) 625 [36 Pac. (2d) 618, 95 A. L. R. 760], plaintiff
could reCOver payments made to the bank, but only to the
extent that the bank was unjustly enriched thereby. The court
stated that" appellant, as trustee of the money paid to it by
respondent, should be afforded the opportunity of showing, as
it asserts it can, that it has paid over to the beneficial owner
the money for which judgment has been taken against it.
Such a showing, if made, will disclose that the appellant, an
innocent party to the fraud, has not been unjustly enriched
and will preclude the entry of a monetary judgment against
it under the rule mentioned." The judgment was reversed as
to the bank, with the following instructions: "That portion
of the judgment awarding plaintiff $1,890 as against the appellant Citizens National Trust and Savings Bank, as trus- .
tee, is reversed, with directions to the court below to permit
said appellant if it be so inclined, to offer evidence as to the
disposition of the money paid to it by the respondent."
(Weiner v. Roof, 10 Cal. (2d) 450 [74 Pac. (2d) 736J.)
The evidence at the second trial was therefore confined to
the disposition made by the bank of the money paid to it by
plaintiff. The bank, by its accounts and the testimony of one
of its officers, showed that in accordance with the terms of
the trust it had disbursed' the $1,890 received from plaintiff
as follows: $1,157.46 was credited to itself toward the payment of Connolly's indebtedness; $346.75 was credited to the
general trust aMount, from which the general expenses of the
truliJtwere paid, and $385.79 was credited to the improvement
account, from which the cost of street improvements to the
tract were paid. The bank showed that at the time of plaintiff's rescission the trust had paid out not only the funds in
the various trust accounts but over $7,000 more advanced to
it by the bank. On the basis of this evidence, the trial court
found that the trustee had paid to the beneficial owners all
the money it received from plaintiff, and rendered judgment
l' for the bank.
'
. [1] Plaintiff contends that the bank is liable for the
money received by it because the money was never actually
paid over to the beneficiaries. The bank, however, in making
the collections from the purchasers of the lots in its capacity
as trustee acted as agent on behalf of its principals, J. B.
Roof, Inc;, and Connolly. The same rule governs the liability
of the bank in such a situation whether it is designated a
'.,

e
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trustee or agent. (See Rest., Restitution, sees. 143 (a), (b), 190
(a) ; Rest., Agency, sec. 13; 1 Cal. Jur. 689, 690; 25 Cal. Jur.
121, 122; Weiner v. Roof, supra.) It is well settled that one
who has paid money through fraud or mistake to an innocent
agent, may recover the amount from the agent unless the latter has paid it to the principal, spent it on behalf of the principal, or paid it to a third party on behalf of the principal.
(Rest., Restitution, sec. 143 (b); Rest., !Agency, sec. 339 (f);
Crocker-Woolworth Nat. Bank v. Nevada Bank, 139 Cal. 564
(73 Pac. 456] ; Becsey v. California Title Ins. & Trust Co., 192
Cal. 632 [221 Pac. 356] ; Craig v. Boone, 146 Cal. 718 [81 Pac.
22] ; Weiner v. Roof, supra. See 2 C. J. 821-823.)
[2] The fact that the agent credits the principal with the
amount received does not release the agent from his obligation to make restitution so long as he continues to hold the
money on behalf of the principal (Rest., Restitution, sec 143
(b) ; Rest., Agency, sec. 339 (f); see National Bank of Calif·
v. Miner, 167 Cal. 532 (140 Pac. 27] ; 2 C. J. 823) ; but when
the agent parts with the money in accordance with theJl~ency,
he is released from liability. In the present case the mere
crediting of $346.75 and $385.79 to the general account and
the improvement account respectively could not release the
bank from the obligation to withdraw these sums from the
accounts and repay them to plaintiff, but having actually expended the money on behalf of the trust, the beneficial owners of which constitute its principal, it is no longer required
to make restitution.
[3a] Most of the money received by the bank from plaintiff,
however, was applied on Connolly's indebtedness to it. It therefore still has that amount, not as trustee, but in its private capacity. [4] If an innocent agent receives money through
mistake or fraud and pays it to a third party on behalf of his
principal in payment of a debt owed the third party by the
principal, the agent cannot be required to make restitution
of the money. [5] If the third party has no notice of the
claims of the original owner, he is a bona fide purchaser for
value and may keep the amount as against the original owner"
whose only remedy is against the principal on the grounds of
fraud, mistake, or unjust enrichment. (Rest., Restitution, secs.
13,172, 173(e) ; Rest., Trusts, sec. 304(2) (a) ; Frey v. Clifford,
44 Cal. 335, 342; Davis v. Russell, 52 Cal. 611 (28 Am. Rep.
647] ; Poorman v. Wallace, 75 Cal. 552 [17 Pac. 680] ; Virginia Timber & Lumber Co. v. Glenwood Lumber Co., 5 Cal.
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App. 256 [90 Pac. 48] ; Chapman v. Hughes, 134 Cal. 641, 658
[58 Pac. 298, 60 Pac. 974, 66 Pac. 982]. See Cal. Civ. Code,
secs. 1796, 3106.) Extinguishment· of the past indebtedness
by the third party is considered a change of position sufficient
to preclude a recovery from him even though it would bepossible for him to give up the money and retain his original
claim against the debtor. (See 21 Cal.L. Rev. 311 et seq.; 45
Harv. L. Rev. 1333 et seq.; 33 Yale L. J. 628 etseq.; 2 Williston, Sales, (2d ed.) sec. 620.)
[6] If the agent himself is the creditor of his principal,
and with the latter's consent applies the money received to,
ward the payment of the debt, he is likewise a bona fide purchaser for value and may retain the money as against the
original owner. (Rest., Restitution, sec. 143 (b) ; Rest., Agency,
sec. 339(f); Bradley Lumber Co. v. Bradley County Bank,
206 Fed. 41 [124 C. C. A. 175] ; White v. Rutherford, (Tex.
Civ. App.) 148S. W. 598; Winslow v. Anderson, 78 N. H.
478 [102 Atl. 310] ; La Farge v. Kneeland, 7 Cow. (N: Y.)
456; Mowatt v. McLelan, (N. Y.) 1 Wend. 173; Langley v.
Warner, 3 N. Y. 327; Cullen v. Donahue, 45 R. I. 237 [121
Atl. 392] ; Holland v. Russell, (1861) 1 B. & S. 424, affmd.
4 B. & S. 14; Taylor v. Metropolitan Ry., (1906) 2 K. B. 55;
Bessler Movable Stairway Co. v. Bank of Leakesville, 140
Miss. 537 [106 Pac. 445]; Hullet v. Cadick Milling Co., 90
Ind. App. 271 [168 N. E. 610]. See 21 Cal. L. Rev. 311,
324; 45 Harv. L. Rev. 1333, 1346; 2 C. J. 821-823.) The fact
that the agent is the same person as the creditor and may keep
the money himself in payment of the debt does not prejudice
his right so long as the payment is authorized by the principal. The legalefIect is the same as if the money were deliv.
ered by the agent to the principal and then redelivered by
the principal to the agent in payment· of the debt. Such for.
malism, however, is unnecessary. In the words of the Restate,
ment of Restitution, (section 143, comment b): "Where an
agent receives money on account of the principal, the agent
may, by agreement with the principal, apply such money upon
an indebtedness of the principal to him. In this case the agent
becomes a bona fide purchaser of the money and is entitled to
keep it although paid to him by mistake.... The fact that
upon making repayment to the payor, the fiduciary would
himself be able to maintain an action against the beneficiarj'
does not prevent the defense of change of position. This is
true even though the beneficiary is available and has sufficient
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assets to respond to a judgment for that amount; the remedy
of the payor is against the beneficiary either directly or by
subrogation." Thus in the present case the bank credited to
itself, as authorized by the trust, some of the money received
from plaintiff in payment of the indebtedness owed it by its
principal. In its capacity as trustee it has paid out the money.
In its private capacity it is a bona fide purchaser for value,
entitled to retain the amount as against the plaintiff.
There are decisions that require an innocent agent to make
restitution of money received by fraud or mistake when he
has applied the money toward the payment of a debt owed
him by his principal. (Herlihy v. Independence State Bank,
261 N. Y. 309 [185 N. E. 393] ; Alberta Pac. Grain Co. v.
Dominion Bank, 55 Dom. L. R. 735; Nat'l Bank of Calif· v.
Miner, supra.) These cases reason that the agent has not
changed his position but has merely given the principal a
credit, and that he may remove the credit upon giving up the
money and retain his claim against the principal. The same
argument would apply to any bona fide purchaser who has
received money or property in payment of a past indebtedness from a debtor who procured it by fraud or mistake. [7]
It is established in California, however, that a past indebtedness is sufficient value to justify the bona fide purchaser in
retaining the money as against the original owner, and that
the bona fide purchaser will not be left to his original claim
against the debtor. (Frey v. Clifford, supra; Davis v. Russell, supra; Foorman v. Wallace, supra; Virginia Lumber Co.
v. Glenwood Lumber Co., supra; Chapman v. Hughes, supra.)
The d~cisions cited above requiring restitution are derived
from the rule that an agent is required to restore money paid
to him through mistake or fraud when he has credited his
principal with the amount but still retains it in his possession. They fail to distinguish between an agent who holds
the money on behalf of his principal after crediting it to the
principal's account and an agent who has received the money,
with the consent of the principal, in payment of a debt owed
to him by the principal. In the latter situation the agent is
in the position of a bona fide purchaser for value; in the former he is not.
[3b] In the present case the bank applied the money received from the plaintiff to the debt owed it by Connolly in accord with the terms of the trust and with Connolly's consent. It
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had no knowledge of plaintiff's claim at the time it credited
itself with the amount. In its capacity as agent it has therefore paid out plaintiff's money on behalf of its principal, and
in its private capacity it is a bona fide purchaser for value,
entitled to retain the money.
This action is confined to the disposition made by the bank
of the funds received by it from plaintiff. It is therefore
irrelevant that the bank as trustee has subsequently received
money for the trust from other purchasers of lots. Plaintiff
has a judgment against J. B.Roof, Inc., one of the beneficiaries under the trust, and may subject the interest of J. B.
Roof, Inc., in the trust to levy and sale under execution.
The judgment is affirmed.
Gibson, C. J., Shenk, J., Curtis, J.,Edmonds, J., Houser,
J., and Carter, J., concurred.

[L. A. No. 17346. In Bank. Mar. 5, 1942.]

G. C. DEGARMO, Respondent, v. A. GOLDMAN et a1.,
Appellants.
[1] Actions - Classifications - Determination of Nature.-'In the
determination of the character of an action as being legal or
equitable for jurisdictional purposes,. the doctrine that the/
court should look to the historical basis of the plaintiff's right
under the English law in the light of such modifications. as
have taken place in this country is not always accurate. The
equitable characteristics of the relief sought must be considered. (Philpott v. Superior Court, 1 Cal. (2d) 512 [36 Pac.
(2d) 35, 95 A. L. R. 990] qualified.)
[2] Corporations-Officers-Removal-Nature of Action.-A statutory action by a stockholder or stockholders for the removal
of corporate directors for misconduct, brought pursuant to
MeR:. Dig. References: [1] Actions, § 13; [2-4, 8, 9] Corporations, § 554; [5-7] Equity, § 27; [10] Appeal and Error, § 407;
[11, 12] Appeal and Error, § 922; [13] Appeal and Error, § 912.

